Professional conduct before the court

Lawyers are advocates, but tribunals must be able to rely upon counsel not to knowingly make material false statements. An attorney may argue that a witness is unreliable, that evidence supports another interpretation, or that precedent should be distinguished. Those are legal arguments.

An attorney may not knowingly tell the court that a witness said something the witness never said, claim that an order exists when it does not, invent rule text, or cite a fictional case. This duty applies equally when attorneys use AI, templates, search tools, or prior filings. If the computer invents United States v. Convenient Result, the lawyer remains responsible for the unfortunate moment when the judge searches for it.

Attorneys may prepare witnesses by explaining procedure, reviewing prior statements, discussing likely questions, and reviewing relevant materials. That preparation should help the witness provide truthful and understandable testimony.

Counsel may not manufacture testimony or instruct a witness to provide a false account. Likewise, attorneys may create diagrams, timelines, maps, or other demonstrative materials when those materials are honestly identified. A chart created for trial is not fabricated evidence merely because counsel created it; a fake screenshot presented as authentic is a completely different problem.

Legal proceedings are adversarial, but attorneys should not use litigation merely to harass, humiliate, threaten, or obstruct another participant. Counsel may argue aggressively, seek sanctions when justified, challenge evidence, expose contradictions, and preserve every lawful right available to the client.

A claim is not frivolous merely because it is difficult, novel, unpopular, or unlikely to succeed. Lawyers may argue that precedent should be distinguished, limited, modified, or overruled where a good-faith basis exists. The problem arises when filings are knowingly baseless and are used solely to harass, delay, retaliate, or burden another person.

Government counsel represents the lawful interests of the Government, but prosecution is not simply a scoreboard. A prosecutor may advocate vigorously for conviction, punishment, sanctions, detention, or other lawful relief, but must exercise prosecutorial authority fairly and professionally.

A prosecutor should not knowingly pursue a charge lacking the required factual or legal basis and should comply with required disclosure obligations. The fact that disclosure helps the defense does not create an invisible "unless this makes my case worse" exception.

Defense counsel is expected to provide loyal, independent, and meaningful representation to the accused. Counsel may challenge every element the Government is required to prove, question witness credibility, challenge evidence, raise jurisdictional objections, contest procedure, and argue against punishment.

Defense counsel does not act improperly merely by requiring the Government to prove its case. Counsel remains bound by honesty, evidence integrity, and candor. Strong advocacy does not require fabricated evidence or knowingly false statements.

Legal and judicial decisions should be made through lawful processes rather than threats, favors, secret pressure, retaliation, or abuse of rank. A commander may possess lawful command authority and a supervisor may possess lawful administrative authority. Neither automatically possesses the right to dictate an attorney's professional judgment or a judge's decision in a specific case.

A judge who receives an improper attempt at influence may need to preserve the communication, disclose it, refer the conduct, or take another appropriate action. Professional judgment should come from law, the record, and authorized discretion rather than whoever happens to have the loudest voice or nicest collar insignia.

Judges must decide cases according to law, evidence, authorized discretion, and the official record. Friendship, hostility, public pressure, command preference, popularity, and unrelated personal disputes should not determine the result of a case.

Judicial independence does not mean a judge is immune from appellate review, ethics rules, or lawful administration. It means the result of a particular case cannot properly be dictated by someone outside the judicial process simply because that person is senior or unhappy.

A judge may need to recuse when impartiality can reasonably be questioned because of personal interest, prior material participation, prohibited relationships, prejudgment, or another serious circumstance. An adverse ruling alone does not establish bias. If losing one motion automatically disqualified the judge, the Corps would eventually run out of judges before lunch.

Ex parte communications also require caution. Administrative discussion about scheduling or technical access may be permissible, but secret substantive advocacy to the judge without another party who is entitled to participate can seriously compromise fairness. Where an improper ex parte communication occurs, corrective action may include disclosure, response opportunities, preservation of the communication, referral, or recusal depending upon the circumstances.

Supervisors may assign work, review filings, train attorneys, correct mistakes, and establish lawful procedures. They may not order, encourage, knowingly permit, or knowingly ratify professional misconduct.

A subordinate attorney remains responsible for clearly prohibited conduct even when a superior gave the order. "My supervisor told me to falsify it" explains the origin of the problem; it does not cure the problem.

Serious professional misconduct may need to be reported through authorized channels. A complaint is an allegation, not a finding of guilt, and preliminary review should determine whether formal investigation is warranted.

Professional consequences may range from counseling and training to reprimand, restrictions on practice, suspension, removal from specified duties, or revocation of certification. Professional discipline is separate from criminal punishment, even though the same conduct may sometimes implicate both systems.